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The 28.7 million small businesses in the United States—99% of all American businesses—are
the backbone of the American economy. Historically, small businesses relied on community banks
for their credit needs. Over the last decade, however, small businesses increasingly have turned
to “fintech” lenders—nonbank lenders that are largely unregulated. Nonbank consumer lending
is governed by consumer protection statutes, but nonbank small business lending is outside of
any clear regulatory framework that would protect borrowers from potentially predatory practices.
This Article argues that the optimal regulatory regime is a combination of both state authority over
fintech lenders and inclusion of small business borrowers in federal consumer protection statutes.
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The 28.7 million small businesses in the United States—99% of all 
American businesses—are the backbone of the American economy. 
Historically, small businesses relied on community banks for their 
credit needs. Over the last decade, however, small businesses 
increasingly have turned to “fintech” lenders—nonbank lenders that 
are largely unregulated. Nonbank consumer lending is governed by 
consumer protection statutes, but nonbank small business lending is 
outside of any clear regulatory framework that would protect 
borrowers from potentially predatory practices. This Article argues 
that the optimal regulatory regime is a combination of both state 
authority over fintech lenders and inclusion of small business 
borrowers in federal consumer protection statutes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The 28.7 million small businesses in the United States—99% of all 
American businesses1—are the backbone of the American economy.2 The 
definition of a “small business” varies, but if we consider businesses with 
under 500 employees, they employ over half of all American workers and 
are drivers of economic prosperity.3 Historically, small businesses relied 
on banks—particularly community banks—to fulfill their credit needs. 
Over the last decade, small businesses increasingly have been obtaining 
credit from “fintech” lenders—nonbank lenders that are largely 
unregulated. “Fintech,” or financial technology, refers to technology 
firms that provide lending services outside of the traditional regulated 
banking context, using algorithmic decision-making processes rather than 
traditional credit scores and income verification.4 While the rise of fintech 
lenders may open up credit opportunities to new borrowers, their rates and 
                                                                                                                 
 1. “Small businesses” comprise a generically large category: if defined by all 
businesses with fewer than 500 employees, small businesses comprise 99% of all U.S. 
businesses and half of the American private-sector workforce. JPMorgan Chase & Co. 
Inst., Small Business Data Dashboard (Sept. 2016), https://www.jpmorganchase.com/ 
corporate/institute/document/jpmc-institute-small-business-report-dashboard.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G3V6-X2PA]. See generally Diana Farrell & Chris Wheat, THE UPS 
AND DOWNS OF SMALL BUSINESS EMPLOYMENT: BIG DATA ON PAYROLL GROWTH AND 
VOLATILITY (JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. INST., 2017); Mark E. Schweitzer & Brett 
Barkley, Is “Fintech” Good for Small Business Borrowers? Impacts on Firm Growth 
and Customer Satisfaction (Fed. Res. Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper No. 17-01, 
2017). 
 2. Out of 28.7 million small businesses, 5.7 million are Main Street businesses, 
small- and medium-size suppliers to larger corporations, and high-growth startups. 
JPMorgan Chase & Co. Inst., supra note 1. See generally Karen G. Mills & Brayden 
McCarthy, The State of Small Business Lending: Innovation and Technology and the 
Implications for Regulations 2 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 17-042, 2016). 
 3. Small businesses are the source of 60% of the net new jobs over the last two 
decades. See Mills & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 3, 14. 
 4. Though fintech is also growing inside traditional banking institutions as a way 
of conducting businesses, this Article focuses on the distinct nonbank entities that 
conduct lending, even though many nonbank fintech entities do partner with banks. 
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terms are often worse, and satisfaction with the borrowing experience is 
lower, as compared to traditional bank borrowing.5 Fintech lending is not 
a niche sector; the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
projects that the market could grow up to $122 billion by 2020.6 
While non-bank consumer lending is governed by consumer 
protection statutes, non-bank small business lending is currently outside 
of any clear regulatory framework that would protect borrowers from 
potentially predatory practices. 7  The fact that a fintech borrower is 
covered by consumer protection statutes when he borrows $100,000 to 
remodel his house, but not when he borrows to capitalize his business, 
motivates the argument that small business borrowers should be covered 
under the consumer protection statutes. Small business borrowers 
generally do not have the sophistication of large commercial borrowers 
and have more in common with consumer borrowers than with large 
businesses.8 The Treasury Department under the Obama Administration 
gave support to this perspective: “strong evidence indicates that small 
business loans under $100,000 share common characteristics with 
consumer loans yet do not enjoy the same consumer protections.”9 Small 
business borrowers are not covered under the consumer protection 
statutes that require clear disclosure of often-opaque lending terms, and 
that allow regulators to hold predatory behavior accountable.10 
Fintech lending can, in principle, be a vital new source of credit to 
America’s small businesses. Nonbank fintech borrowing increased 
because bank lending was severely constricted after the financial crisis, 
                                                                                                                 
 5. FED. RES. BANKS, 2017 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY: REPORT ON 
EMPLOYER FIRMS iv, 18 (2018). 
 6. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-254, FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY: 
ADDITIONAL STEPS BY REGULATORS COULD BETTER PROTECT CONSUMERS AND AID 
REGULATORY OVERSIGHT 7 (2018). 
 7. At least five federal agencies have authority over traditional bank lending, along 
with state regulators, including the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau, and the National Credit Union Administration. Letter from Am. for 
Fin. Reform, to U.S. Senate (Apr. 14, 2017) (on file with author). 
 8. See Barbara J. Lipman & Ann Marie Wiersch, Alternative Lending Through the 
Eyes of “Mom & Pop” Small-Business Owners: Findings from Online Focus Groups 5 
(Fed. Res. Bank of Cleveland 2015). 
 9. U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, Opportunities and Challenges in Online Marketplace 
Lending 28 (2016). 
 10. SPENCER M. COWAN, PATTERNS OF DISPARITY: SMALL BUSINESS LENDING IN THE 
CHICAGO AND LOS ANGELES-SAN DIEGO REGIONS 30 (Woodstock Inst. 2017). 
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especially for the small-dollar loans ($250,000 and under) that small 
businesses typically seek.11 Seventy-five percent of loan applications by 
small businesses are for amounts under $250,000; 55% are for amounts 
under $100,000.12 The ongoing consolidation of the banking sector, in 
which larger banks are absorbing community banks, combined with the 
decline in small-dollar loan offerings by larger banks, created space in the 
last decade for fintech lending to thrive in the small business lending 
space. At the same time, technology advances allowed the advent of the 
larger nonbank financial marketplace. New firms use alternative data 
sources and “big data”-driven algorithms to evaluate creditworthiness.13 
What is different about the fintech borrower experience? Unlike 
regulated brick-and-mortar banks, fintech firms provide and underwrite 
loans online. There are no standardized disclosure requirements or loan 
terms. Several studies have shown interest rates to be higher than those of 
comparable bank loans.14 There is a risk that unregulated lending to small 
businesses could be predatory and unsustainable. 15  Small businesses 
report high levels of dissatisfaction with fintech lenders, as compared to 
bank lending, particularly regarding transparency of terms and the price 
of the loan.16 Credit is a double-edged sword: small and new businesses 
need access to credit to survive, but risky credit that small companies 
cannot afford, or do not understand the terms of, can be devastating. High 
interest payments can drive small businesses into bankruptcy. 
A clear regulatory framework has been slow to catch up to the 
industry’s growth. As this Article will argue, the optimal regulatory 
regime is a combination of state authority and inclusion of small business 
borrowers (whose loans are below a certain threshold) in consumer 
protection statutes. State regulators should have the ability to regulate 
fintech lending to small businesses, building on a robust and diverse set 
of state policies governing nonbank financial entities. Alongside state law 
                                                                                                                 
 11. See Mills & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 5-6. 
 12. FED. RES. BANKS, supra note 5, at 6. 
 13. See Julapa Jagtiani & Catharine Lemieux, Fintech Lending: Financial Inclusion, 
Risk Pricing, and Alternative Information 7 (Fed. Res. Bank of Phila., Working Paper 
No. 17-17, 2017). 
 14. See, e.g., id. at 10. See also discussion infra Section III. 
 15. See Mills & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 86; see also U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 11-613, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES: 
PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING: NEW REGULATORY CHALLENGES COULD EMERGE AS THE 
INDUSTRY GROWS 31 (2011). 
 16. FED. RES. BANKS, supra note 5, at 14. 
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and regulatory authority, the consumer statutes that are overseen by the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) should be updated to 
cover small business borrowers below a certain threshold. 
An alternate regulatory framework has been proposed by the Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). The OCC proposes creating a 
“special purpose nonbank charter,” (the Nonbank Charter Program) 
which would allow fintechs to operate nationally pursuant to private and 
entity-specific operating agreements with the OCC, rather than under 
federal banking law.17 The OCC claims it is authorized to create such a 
charter under the National Bank Act (NBA). 18  This proposal is 
problematic because it would preempt state law by bringing fintech 
lenders under the national banking regulatory scheme, lowering borrower 
protections and the authority of state regulators to license and regulate 
fintechs in a number of states. This approach is also likely unauthorized 
because fintech lenders should not be considered banks under the NBA. 
This Article makes the case for regulation of the fintech small 
business lending market and proposes a path forward for policymakers 
and regulators. Part I outlines the decline in bank lending to small 
businesses. Part II documents the rise of the fintech lending industry. Part 
III examines fintech lending and borrower outcomes, specifically for 
small business borrowers. Part IV focuses on the regulatory alternatives 
available for small business fintech lending and their competing 
arguments for authority. 
I. THE DECLINE OF TRADITIONAL SMALL BUSINESS LENDING 
Small-dollar bank loans to small businesses have been in decline,19 
though big bank lending to larger businesses recovered after the financial 
crisis. Community banks were small businesses’ traditional lenders, and 
the consolidation of the community banking sector has been a core 
                                                                                                                 
 17. Mills & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 8, 103. 
 18. See National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 38 (2012). 
 19. Mills & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 24. A full discussion of the decline of 
community banks is beyond the scope of this paper. See, e.g., Katy Milani, Community 
Banking is Alive, Well: The Three Myths about Dodd-Frank and Community Banks, 
ROOSEVELT INST. (June 8, 2017), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/community-banking-alive-
well-three-myths-about-dodd-frank-and-community-banks/ [https://perma.cc/2Z98-C4 
6H]. 
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challenge for small businesses.20 Even before the financial crisis, small 
banks began to lose market share to big banks as economies of scale and 
financial deregulation made it harder for small banks to compete on low-
margin loans.21 This section will explore the downward trend of bank 
lending to small businesses and the funding gap that remains. 
The number of community banks fell from 14,000 in the mid-1980s 
to 5,000 today.22 Even as overall bank assets have risen, the availability 
of credit for smaller loans has fallen.23 The downward trend in small loans 
began a sharp decline during the financial crisis of 2008.24 According to 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the number of bank-
based commercial loans of $1 million or less fell every year since 2008, 
even while loans to larger businesses recovered.25 New business startups 
also declined abruptly during the crisis and have not recovered,26 and 
small businesses faced significant job losses.27 
In 2017, less than 50% of small businesses reported receiving the full 
amount they applied for in credit across all lenders.28 Karen Mills and 
Brayden McCarthy analyzed the small business funding landscape and 
found that, even years after the end of the recession, a significant funding 
                                                                                                                 
 20. See Julapa Jagtiani & Catharine Lemieux, SMALL BUSINESS LENDING: 
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR COMMUNITY BANKS 5 (Fed. Res. Bank of Chi. 
2016). 
 21. See id. at 2. 
 22. Mills & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 5. 
 23. Id. This finding is not universal; Jagtiani et al. find that mergers involving 
community banks did not adversely affect lending to small businesses. See Julapa Jagtiani 
et al., The Evolution of U.S. Community Banks and its Impact on Small Business Lending 
1 (Fed. Res. Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 14–16, 2014). 
 24. See Jagtiani et al., supra note 23, at 2. 
 25. Mills & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 29. 
 26. There are numerous explanations, in addition to the credit constraints identified 
here, of why small business startups declined that are outside of the scope of this paper. 
They include rising student loan debt and a crash in consumer demand. 
 27. According to Mills and McCarthy: 
From the employment peak immediately before the recession through March 2009—
the recession low point for private nonfarm employment—jobs at small businesses 
declined about 11%, while payrolls at businesses with 500 or more employees shrank 
about 7%, according to the Business Employment Dynamics (BED) database from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. This disparity was even more significant among the smallest 
of small businesses. Employment declined 14.1% in establishments with fewer than 50 
employees, compared with 9.5% in businesses with 50 to 500 employees, while 
overall employment decreased 8.4%. 
Mills & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 17. 
 28. FED. RES. BANKS, supra note 5, at 7. 
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gap remains, especially for micro loans.29  As an example, Mills and 
McCarthy note that microbusinesses—those with revenues under 
$100,000—were half as likely to receive the funding they sought than 
firms with over $10 million in revenue.30 Even though small business 
lending by large banks still maintains a high dollar volume, a declining 
portion of this lending is going to the loans on the smaller end, or firms 
on the newer end, of the spectrum.31 
II. THE RISE OF THE FINTECH LENDING INDUSTRY 
Fintech lending is a young industry. Before turning specifically to 
fintech small business lending, it is useful to understand the evolution of 
fintech lending as a whole and how it is different than bank-based lending. 
“Fintech” refers to an extremely broad set of activities. Frank Pasquale 
divides fintech into “incrementalist” fintech, which utilizes technology to 
provide standard financial services, and “futurist” fintech, in which the 
entire financial system is remade due to distributed technologies.32 The 
                                                                                                                 
 29. See Mills & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 6; see also Karen G. Mills & Brayden 
McCarthy, The State of Small Business Lending: Credit Access during the Recovery and 
How Technology May Change the Game 11 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 15–
004, 2014). 
 30. See Mills & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 41. 
 31. The shift has been rapid away from bank-driven small business lending in the 
startup phase of a firm: 
for instance, bank financing was used by just 12.3% of firms that were less than two 
years old at the time of the 2014 survey. By contrast, 18.4% of six- to ten-year-old 
businesses and more than 20% of older firms used business loans from banks or other 
financial institutions to get started. A 2015 survey by seven regional Federal Reserve 
Banks found that 58% of firms two years old or younger couldn’t get all the financing 
they needed. Just 12.9% of Hispanic-owned firms and 15.2% of black-owned 
businesses used a business loan from a bank or financial institution to get started, 
compared with 19% of firms owned by whites. 
See Ruth Simon & Paul Overberg, Funding Sources Shift for Startups, WALL STREET J., 
Sept. 28, 2016. Lisa Servon provides one illustration of the capital gap facing small 
businesses in New York City. She finds that there is a $6 billion unmet demand for 
business loans within the small and medium enterprise market, and that more generally 
only two-thirds of the demand for such loans is being met in the market. See Lisa Servon 
et al., Estimating the Capital Gap for Small Businesses in New York City, J. PUB. 
BUDGETING, ACCT. & FIN. MGMT. 451 (2011). 
 32. Exploring the Fintech Landscape: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 115th Cong. (2017) (written testimony of Frank Pasquale, 
Professor of L., U. of Md.). 
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GAO defines fintech as the “use of technology and innovation to provide 
financial services.”33 
For fintech lenders, consumer lending has been the dominant focus 
of fintechs, starting with the original peer-to-peer lending platforms like 
Lending Club and Prosper, although a minority of lending went to small 
business borrowers. 34  Fintech firms have gained market share by 
differentiating themselves from traditional lenders in their speed of 
response to the prospective borrower, the way they use data, what data 
they use, and their ability to extend credit to those who are otherwise 
unable to access bank credit. The purpose of fintech lending, as described 
by the growing industry, is to expand opportunities for credit and help 
borrowers refinance and consolidate credit that may have higher interest 
rates, such as credit cards.35 
One of fintech’s distinguishing features is how, and how fast, it 
makes decisions about who is creditworthy. Most fintech lenders provide 
funding decisions within forty-eight to seventy-two hours.36 To make 
decisions, they use data-rich algorithms with unconventional data 
sources37 rather than the relationship-based and standard credit variables 
that traditional retail banking operations use, such as credit scores and 
income verification. In other words, fintech’s innovative use of 
                                                                                                                 
 33. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 6, at 3. 
 34. See generally LENDING CLUB, LENDING CLUB STAT. https://www.lendingclub. 
com/info/download-data.action [https://perma.cc/PW7H-94 TN] (last visited Nov. 12, 
2018). 
 35. See, e.g., Marketplace Lending Association, The Marketplace Lending 
Association Best Practices (Sept. 16, 2018), http://marketplacelendingassociation.org/ 
industry-practices/ [https://perma.cc/3GXP-BWH9]. 
 36. See Mills & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 12. 
 37. Major online lenders such as SoFi and Kabbage claim to not use FICO scores at 
all when evaluating borrowers. The president of Prosper, another major lender, said that 
“Prosper gets 500 pieces of data on each borrower; the FICO score is just one data 
point.” Penny Crosman, Will Fintechs Kill the FICO Score?, American Banker (June 14, 
2016) https://www.americanbanker.com/news/will-fintechs-kill-the-fico-score [https:// 
perma.cc/RES6-FE5T]. Small business lenders are pulling data from customer 
transaction data sources, real-time bank information, Quickbooks, IRS tax returns, and 
even reviews of businesses’ products online. For consumer lending, fintech lenders are 
using data from utility payments, insurance claims, use of mobile phone and internet, and 
other demographic and personal details drawn from social networking sites. The use of 
such nontraditional data raises concerns about disparate impact as well as fair lending 
violations. See Jagtiani & Lemieux, supra note 13, at 7-8. 
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nontraditional data allows new borrowers or traditionally unqualified 
borrowers to access credit. 
While this may be a benefit of fintech, no one can see into the “black 
box” of its decision-making.38 Specifically, there could be violations of 
equal protection and fair lending laws, and there are numerous concerns 
about data privacy, use of data without the prospective borrowers’ 
consent, and data security. Borrowers do not have any ability to review 
and correct data that is used in lending decisions, in contrast to borrowers’ 
ability to review their credit score data from the credit bureaus.39 Another 
challenge from the use of algorithms is the potential for disparate impact, 
as facially neutral data may be correlated with protected classes like race 
and age.40 
The fintech sector is comprised of a wide variety of entity structures 
and business models. Fintech has evolved from platforms that served to 
connect “peers” to sophisticated firms with institutional investors, 
financial institution partnerships, and securitized transactions.41  Many 
fintech firms affiliate with originating depository institutions—such as 
Lending Club’s affiliation with WebBank—and there are a variety of 
hybrid models being developed. 42  Investors are pouring money into 
fintech startups, with almost $14 billion invested in 2016 alone, a 45% 
increase in funding in one year.43 The Treasury Department projects that 
by 2020, origination volumes could reach $90 billion.44 
Mills and McCarthy define three specific fintech business models: 
online balance sheet lenders, peer-to-peer lenders, and lender-agnostic 
                                                                                                                 
 38. See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS 
THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 3, 17 (Harv. U. Press, 2015). 
 39. See U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, supra note 9, at 20. 
 40. See OFFICE OF CONGRESSMAN EMANUEL CLEAVER, II, 115TH CONG., FINTECH 
INVESTIGATIVE REP. (2018). 
 41. See Mills & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 54. 
 42. A full discussion of the myriad business models is beyond the scope of this paper. 
See, e.g., Mills & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 54. There are signs that large banks have 
begun a new phase of in-housing or developing robust partnerships to have full fintech 
lending capabilities within their institutions. Mills and McCarthy claim that the industry 
has reached a new stage of maturity such that traditional institutions, such as hedge funds 
and community banks, are engaging in partnerships in order to capitalize on the initial 
success of the industry. 
 43. Aaron Klein, The Coming “FinTech” Revolution, 42 DEMOCRACY J. (Fall 2016), 
https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/42/the-coming-fintech-revolution [https:// 
perma.cc/3EAG-VYYW]. 
 44. See U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, supra note 9, at 9. 
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marketplaces.45 Online balance sheet lenders function similarly to a cash 
advance.46 This includes early lenders like OnDeck and Kabbage.47 The 
loans are mainly short-term, and repayment is through regular deduction 
of a fixed amount of money or a percentage of sales deducted daily from 
the borrower’s bank account.48 “Peer-to-peer” lending platforms focus on 
consumer borrowing, targeting mid- to near-prime borrowers.49 Backed 
by individual investors, these platform companies connect lenders and 
borrowers, and make loan decisions through proprietary algorithms.50 
They perform the traditional underwriting functions of evaluating credit 
and ability to pay.51 Finally, there are marketplace lenders that serve to 
connect prospective borrowers with a variety of lenders with minimal 
transaction costs in order to help borrowers find the best loan, but charge 
fees as middlemen.52 
Since the industry is young and there is no standard dataset, there are 
few studies that examine borrower outcomes. Julapa Jagtiani and 
Catharine Lemieux explore whether fintech lending lowers the price of 
credit for consumers as well as small business borrowers, how the use of 
alternate data sources compares to traditional risk factors, and how credit 
performance compares to similar bank loans.53 They find that Lending 
Club (a major fintech lender) made credit available in geographic areas 
that suffered from declining credit supply, as measured by a loss of bank 
branches, and areas with highly concentrated banking markets. 54  For 
instance, “about 40% of Lending Club consumer loans were made in 
communities that had lost at least 5% of their bank branches.”55 Jagtiani 
and Lemieux also find that the correlation between Lending Club’s 
proprietary loan grades and FICO scores has declined from 80% in 2007 
to 35% in 2016, suggesting that Lending Club’s own ‘alternative data’ 
                                                                                                                 
 45. See Mills & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 54-55. 
 46. See id. at 54. 
 47. See id. 
 48. Such entities often argue that they are not lenders and therefore not subject to 
state licensing and oversight laws. Specific legislation should affirmatively name 
Merchant Cash Advance financing entities as lenders and bring them under the scope of 
regulation proposed below. 
 49. See Mills & McCarthy, supra note 29, at 48. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See id. at 42. 
 52. See id. at 49. 
 53. See Jagtiani & Lemieux, supra note 13, at 3-4. 
 54. See id. at 21. 
 55. See id. 
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has become less similar to traditional FICO scores over time.56 Finally, 
they find that some fintech borrowers have been able to get lower-priced 
credit than they would have been able to from traditional sources; this 
analysis is limited to loans made with the purpose of consolidation of 
other debt. 57  At the same time, the rate spread differential between 
borrowers with A-level loan grades and G-level loan grades (the lowest 
level) widened significantly to 20%.58 The analysis found that Lending 
Club is charging significantly higher spreads in areas with higher levels 
of banking concentration.59 
III. SMALL BUSINESS FINTECH LENDING AND BORROWER OUTCOMES 
This section discusses the growth of fintech small business lending, 
borrower outcomes, and experience. This section also compares fintech 
small business lending outcomes with traditional bank lending outcomes. 
Jagtiani and Lemieux present data on the growth rate of small business 
fintech lenders, while noting that such lending still does not match 
aggregate bank lending. 60  They find that fintech lenders have been 
growing exponentially over the last decade. The 2017 Federal Reserve 
Small Business Credit survey shows a growing rate of small-dollar loans 
made by fintech lenders.61 This survey breaks total borrowing by small 
businesses into bank and fintech components.62 The survey found that 
24% of small firms applied for financing with a fintech lender (up from 
21% in 2016) and 71% of those applications were approved for a loan or 
line of credit, even while small firms continued to apply to banks for 
credit as well (47% applied to small banks for a loan while 49% applied 
to large banks).63 Thirty percent of microbusinesses (those with under 
$100,000 in revenue) applied for a fintech loan, while only 6% of firms 
with over $10 million in revenue did so; large banks meet 58% of their 
credit needs. 64  Medium and high credit risk applicants were most 
successful at obtaining credit from online lenders (71%) as compared to 
                                                                                                                 
 56. See id. at 25. 
 57. See id. at 28. 
 58. See id. 
 59. See id. at 30. 
 60. See id. at 1. 
 61. See FED. RES. BANKS, supra note 5, at iv. 
 62. See id. at 21. 
 63. See id. at iv. 
 64. See id. at 21. 
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large and small banks (35% and 47%, respectively).65 These findings 
show that fintech lending is concentrated among small businesses and 
loans. 
How do fintech small business borrowers evaluate their experience? 
According to the Federal Reserve’s survey of small business borrowers, 
fintech lenders earned just a 35% net satisfaction score from successful 
small business borrowers.66 Comparing this to the 74% satisfaction scores 
earned by small banks demonstrates the dramatic downward shift in 
satisfaction when borrowing from a fintech entity versus a traditional 
bank. 67  For online lenders, 52% of successful applicants who were 
dissatisfied with their experience cited the high-interest rate, while only 
20% and 12% of borrowers cited high interest rates as a concern for large 
and small bank borrowing, respectively.68  Other common reasons for 
dissatisfaction with the fintech borrowing experience included lack of 
transparency (15%) and unfavorable repayment terms (33%).69 
Mark E. Schweitzer and Brett Barkley built on the 2017 Federal 
Reserve Small Business Credit survey by conducting a more robust 
comparison of online lending and traditional lending to small business 
borrowers, focusing on the resulting growth of employment and revenue 
as well as borrower satisfaction. 70  First, they found that businesses 
applying for fintech loans have characteristics making them more like 
firms that were denied financing from other sources than firms that 
received bank loans, which suggests that they are riskier borrowers.71 
Expectations of growth in revenue and employment are similar, whether 
a firm is securing bank or online financing, whereas both are distinct from 
firms that were denied financing.72 However, business satisfaction with 
financing, which captures both the application process and the financing 
terms if they were approved for a loan, is much higher for firms with bank 
                                                                                                                 
 65. See id. at iv. 
 66. See id. 
 67. See id. at 14. 
 68. See id. 
 69. See id. 
 70. See Mark E. Schweitzer & Brett Barkley, Is “Fintech” Good for Small Business 
Borrowers? Impacts on Firm Growth and Customer Satisfaction 1-2 (Fed. Res. Bank of 
Cleveland, Working Paper No. 17-01, 2017). Since the survey itself is limited, 
Schweitzer and Barkley are able to look at the different impacts of the different categories 
of lender through econometric specifications. 
 71. See id. at 8. 
 72. See id. at 9. 
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loans.73 Schweitzer and Barkley find that “firms with bank financing are 
approximately 26.8 percentage points more likely to be satisfied with their 
lender(s) than firms with online financing (75% versus 48.2%).”74 This is 
likely due to the fact that the terms of online loans are not required to be 
disclosed in the same manner as the terms of bank loans. Finally, they 
explore the effects on minority-owned firms. Minority-owned firms had 
higher satisfaction levels with fintech lenders, but this is explained by the 
low satisfaction minority borrowers had with banks to begin with.75 
Another way to evaluate the borrowing experience for fintech 
borrowers is to take a qualitative approach. The Federal Reserve of 
Cleveland ran a series of online focus groups to uncover key issues about 
how small business owners are experiencing and interacting with the 
small business credit market.76 They found that small business owners 
had difficulty comparing credit products, and many were uncertain or 
incorrect in answering questions evaluating their options when faced with 
choosing among loan products.77 Virtually all participants in the focus 
groups said they want transparency of terms, and for loan terms to be 
expressed in ways that allow prospective borrowers to more directly 
compare loan offers.78 
One of the most important considerations for the success of fintech 
lending is whether borrowers are paying back their loans at interest rates 
that they can afford to ensure that unaffordable interest rates do not drive 
them to default. The best evaluation of the efficiency of fintech is how 
available, affordable, and fair credit is. Troublingly, 52% of small 
business owners who borrowed from fintechs were dissatisfied with the 
interest rates on their loans.79 
Several studies focus on the experiences of borrowers in a specific 
geographic area.80 In one study, Weaver, Donaker Brown, and McShane 
present the challenges that arise from “alternative lenders” operating in a 
                                                                                                                 
 73. See id. at 10. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See id. at 11. 
 76. See Mills & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 105. 
 77. See id. 
 78. See Lipman & Wiersch, supra note 8, at 16. 
 79. FED. RES. BANKS, supra note 5, at 14. 
 80. ERIC WEAVER, GWENDY D. BROWN & CAITLIN MCSHANE, OPPORTUNITY FUND, 
UNAFFORDABLE AND UNSUSTAINABLE: THE NEW BUSINESS LENDING ON MAIN STREET 11 
(2016). 
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“regulatory void” in California: high-cost loans with opaque terms.81 
Although the sample was extremely limited,82 their analysis found that the 
average annual percentage rate (APR) for alternative loans was 94%, with 
one loan reaching 358%, far in excess of what is allowed under state usury 
laws.83 High rates lead to their next conclusion: that the average monthly 
loan repayment is 178% of the net income available to the owners.84 They 
also found that more than a quarter of small business borrowers had loans 
outstanding with multiple alternative lenders.85 They note that while some 
lenders are offering responsible loan products, small business owners 
have trouble distinguishing between loans that are useful versus 
extractive to their business because there is a lack of requirements for 
disclosure or transparency.86 
IV. HOW SHOULD FINTECH SMALL BUSINESS LENDING BE 
REGULATED?87 
This Part will argue that the consumer statutes that regulate lending, 
generally at the federal level, should be amended to cover small business 
borrowers, with oversight by the CFPB, and that nonbank fintech lenders 
should be regulated and licensed at the state level. 88  Small business 
                                                                                                                 
 81. Id. 
 82. The authors work for the Opportunity Fund, the nation’s largest non-profit 
micro-lender to small businesses. The Opportunity Fund refinances unsustainable loans; 
thus, their dataset is limited to businesses that approach them for refinancing. Their 
dataset was limited to 104 businesses that had applied to them for funding, who had 
received 150 alternative loans from 54 different lenders. 
 83. Weaver et al., supra note 80, at 11. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 2. 
 87. Other reforms that are beyond the scope of this Article: mandating that loan 
brokers operate as fiduciaries; industry-led reforms such as “Small Business Borrowers’ 
Bill of Rights” which was announced in August 2015, led by Fundera, Funding Circle, 
Lending Club, the Aspen Institute, Small Business Majority, Accion, and Opportunity 
Fund. See generally Signatories, SMALL BUSINESS BORROWERS’ BILL OF RIGHTS, 
http://www.borrowersbillofrights.org/signatories.html [https://perma.cc/86J6-65MZ] 
(last visited Sept. 21, 2018). 
 88. There is universal agreement that regulatory clarity is needed. The Obama 
Administration, research, and industry commentary have pointed out the need for clarity 
in the regulatory space, even though they come to different conclusions about the optimal 
regulatory structure. It is outside the scope of this Article to look at regulatory changes 
for the banking industry, which is developing an increasing scale of partnerships with 
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owners largely do not have the financial expertise or professional support 
to do a sophisticated analysis of their lending options. The fact that the 
vast majority of small businesses apply for loans under $250,000, and the 
majority of those apply for loans under $100,000, belies the assumption 
that these are “sophisticated” borrowers.89 Eighty-seven percent of small 
business owners are relying on their personal credit scores and using 
personal collateral to finance their small businesses,90 further blurring the 
line between consumer and business borrowing and demonstrating why 
protection is essential. The lack of protection of small business borrowers 
by the consumer protection statutes creates the opportunity for predatory 
lending.91 Entanglement of an owner’s personal credit history and his or 
her application for business lending can bring issues of racial 
discrimination into the process. Preliminary findings by Representative 
Emmanuel Cleaver included that small business owners of color are more 
likely to borrow from fintechs and that lenders “appear to be determining 
the race of the borrower even when it’s not on the application.”92 Though 
it may be difficult to pinpoint the correct threshold at which a small 
business owner has enough financial sophistication to be regulated as a 
truly commercial borrower from nonbank entities,93  it is nevertheless 
important to consider the option for microbusinesses (businesses under a 
certain revenue threshold) and startup entrepreneurs. 
This Part considers the various regulatory alternatives available to 
appropriately govern the growing industry. It is crucial for state regulators 
to retain authority over fintech lenders (to both consumers and small 
businesses) in their states. At the federal level, consumer protection 
                                                                                                                 
fintech lenders. Because the bank regulatory universe is already so complex, it requires 
a different set of considerations. New issues arise when the issuer of loans is partnering 
with a depository institution that faces standard bank regulation. However, many 
originating institutions pass loans off within a few days, thus transferring the risk back to 
the fintech entity and with it any regulatory oversight. FDIC issued guidance on such 
relationships but did not clarify how it would coordinate with other agencies. See U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 6, at 6-7. 
 89. Mills & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 3. 
 90. See FED. RES. BANKS, supra note 5, at 5. 
 91. See Mills & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 86. 
 92. Ian McKendry, Are Fintechs Charging Minorities More for Business Loans?, 
AM. BANKER (Oct. 16, 2017) https://www.americanbanker.com/news/are-fintechs-
charging-minorities-more-for-business-loans [https://perma.cc/Z3UT-WV3Y]. 
 93. One starting proposal would be to include all loans under $250,000 in the newly-
revised statutes. However, pinpointing an exact threshold must be subject to empirical 
analysis and is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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statutes should be amended, and the CFPB should be granted rulemaking 
authority for the small business lending market. State regulators currently 
regulate nonbank lending in a variety of forms, such as mortgage lenders 
and payday lenders, and there are policies under development in several 
states to focus specifically on fintech lending, as described below.94 
Finally, this Part considers the alternate regulatory framework proposed 
by the OCC: the Nonbank Charter Program, in which the OCC issues a 
“special purpose” nonbank charter that fintechs can apply for in order to 
harmonize fintech lending and bank lending regulation. This proposal is 
not optimal principally because it would preempt state authority and leave 
borrowers still uncovered by core consumer protection statutes. Secondly, 
it is likely outside of the OCC’s authority, as fintechs should not be 
considered banks under the NBA because they are not depositories. These 
arguments are described in detail below. 
A. AMENDING CONSUMER PROTECTION STATUTES TO 
INCLUDE SMALL BUSINESS BORROWERS 
Congress should enact clear borrower protections for small business 
borrowers by expanding the core federal consumer protection statutes to 
cover small business loans. In conjunction, Congress should formally 
expand the CFPB’s jurisdiction over small business lending. One statute 
that should be amended is the Truth in Lending Act (TILA),95 which can 
be amended to cover all borrowers under a certain threshold,96 regardless 
of the purpose of such borrowing. Other key statutes to amend include the 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA),97 Fair Debt Collection Practices 
Act (FDCPA),98  Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA),99  and the Credit 
Practices Rule of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
Act. 100  With the exception of the ECOA, the laws do not cover 
commercial borrowers, whether small or large businesses, because 
                                                                                                                 
 94. See, e.g., S.B. 2865, 99th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2017), http://www.ilga.gov/ 
legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocTypeID=SB&DocNum=2865&GAID=13&SessionID=88
&LegID=96183 [https://perma.cc/QW5T-UVHF]. 
 95. See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(i) (2012) (limiting coverage to lending to individuals 
“primarily for personal, family, or household purposes”). 
 96. It is beyond the scope of this Article to determine the appropriate threshold. 
 97. See Mills & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 93-94. 
 98. See id. at 94. 
 99. See id. 
 100. See FTC Credit Practices Rule, 16 C.F.R § 444 (2018). 
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commercial borrowers are presumed to be sophisticated borrowers. And 
even though commercial borrowers are covered under the ECOA, data is 
not yet formally collected, so disparate impact claims cannot be 
evaluated. 
The TILA requires lenders to provide fair and accurate loan cost 
information to allow borrowers to compare loan terms, bans advertising 
practices that are deemed deceptive or misleading, and gives borrowers 
the right of rescission (cancellation of the loan) for three days.101 The 
TILA currently excludes business credit from its disclosure requirements; 
it applies to home loans, student loans, credit cards, and other consumer 
borrowing. 102  The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act)103 granted rulemaking authority under 
TILA to the CFPB. Amending the TILA to bring small business 
borrowing from nonbank institutions under the protection of the law 
would secure the ability of small business owners to obtain clear 
information on potential loans. Some industry insiders may argue that 
requiring such uniform disclosure would stifle innovation and hurt access 
to credit, while others in the industry are currently promoting similar 
disclosure outcomes and comparable loan information in their own self-
regulating industry proposals.104 
Congress should amend the CFPB’s jurisdiction to give it explicit 
authority over the small business lending marketplace, in order to allow 
the CFPB to take enforcement actions for noncompliance with the 
consumer protection laws once it is amended to include small business 
loans. The core jurisdiction of the CFPB, as authorized by the Dodd-Frank 
Act, is over financial products that are “offered or provided for use by 
consumers primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.”105 This 
prevents the CFPB from using its authority to deal with predatory 
behavior that confronts businesses. The CFPB does have supervisory 
authority over a variety of non-depository financial institutions, such as 
payday lenders, student loan providers, mortgage lenders and servicers, 
as well as “larger participants” in the consumer lending market 
                                                                                                                 
 101. See 15 U.S.C. 1635 (2012). 
 102. See 15 U.S.C. 1602 (i) (2012). 
 103. See Pub. L. No. 111-203 (2010). 
 104. See Small Business Borrowers’ Bill of Rights, SMALL BUSINESS BORROWERS’ 
BILL OF RIGHTS (2015), www.borrowersbillofrights.org [https://perma.cc/2KSR-
MB2Y]. 
 105. See 12 U.S.C. § 5481(5)(A) (2012). 
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generally.106 The scope of the CFPB’s jurisdiction could be defined to 
include any transaction for which the borrower is personally liable, 
regardless of the purpose of the loan. Or, it could be defined to cover small 
businesses taking out small loans, by creating a threshold for businesses 
based on the number of employees or the size of the loan. Former CFPB 
Director Richard Cordray supported the expansion of the CFPB’s 
jurisdiction to include small businesses. In a March 2016 hearing, 
Cordray said: 
If I had my way—I don’t have my way on many things—we would 
do what I did when I was Ohio attorney general and seek to protect 
not only individual consumers as our statute authorizes us to do, but 
also small businesses who often operate in the marketplace with no 
greater clout than an individual household does. If the Congress sees 
fit to give us that authority, we will aggressively pursue that. And it 
would help small businesses across the country.107 
One immediate step for the CFPB is to implement Section 1071 of 
the Dodd-Frank Act, which is meant to allow the CFPB to collect data on 
small business lending.108 Although Regulation B of the ECOA prohibits 
discrimination in business credit transactions generally, it does not 
provide a mechanism for determining if discrimination is taking place.109 
Section 1071 was intended to solve that by giving the CFPB the authority 
to collect data on small business borrowing by amending the ECOA to 
require the CFPB to collect data on credit applications by women-owned, 
minority-owned, and small businesses.110 Section 1071 requires statistics 
on the type, purpose, and amount of loans applied for as well as what was 
approved, the type of action taken with respect to such applications, and 
other demographic information about prospective borrowers.111 Although 
“the CFPB initially stated that it [would] act ‘expeditiously’” to put such 
                                                                                                                 
 106. See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(g) (2012). 
 107. The Semi-Annual Report of the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. of Financial Services, 114th Cong. 17 (2016) (statement 
of Richard Cordray, former CFPB Director). 
 108. See Mills & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 31. 
 109. See U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, supra note 9, at 38. 
 110. See Mills & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 31. 
 111. See id. 
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rules into place, no significant progress has been made.112 Because the 
personal characteristics of the business owner are considered but there is 
no process to deal with discriminatory bias, it is possible that some of the 
challenges in the consumer sector are active in the small business 
borrowing sector as well. 113  Additionally, the algorithms that fintech 
firms are using have not been evaluated for their potential discriminatory 
impact.114 The necessary approach is to fully implement Section 1071 and 
then conduct rigorous analysis of the data.115 
The Credit Practices Rule, promulgated under Section 5 of the FTC 
Act, should also be amended to cover small business loans.116 The FTC 
Act prohibits “unfair and deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce” and applies to both consumer and business transactions.117 
The Credit Practices Rule affords further consumer protection against 
abusive terms and conditions in credit contracts, including from nonbank 
lenders such as fintechs.118 As FTC Chair Edith Ramirez stated at an FTC 
marketplace lending forum in June 2016: 
In light of the FTC’s broad jurisdiction over non-bank financial 
entities and our decades of experience enforcing consumer lending 
laws, we want to ensure that consumers are treated fairly when they 
navigate this changing landscape. This includes ensuring that the same 
protections consumers have in traditional lending contexts also apply 
to marketplace lending.119 
The FTC, however, has not yet taken steps to bring small business 
borrowers under the coverage of the Credit Practices Rule.120 The Credit 
Practices Rule covers loans made to consumers who purchase goods or 
                                                                                                                 
 112. See id. at 31-32, nn. 49. Section 1071 was one of the few provisions in Dodd-
Frank without a statutory deadline and has been delayed as a result. Congress should 
place a new deadline on its issuance. 
 113. See U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, supra note 9, at 38. 
 114. Mills & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 93. 
 115. To this end, the CFPB should additionally expand and make accessible its 
Consumer Complaints Database to small business borrowers. 
 116. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 6, at 36. 
 117. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012). 
 118. See Mills & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 92. 
 119. See id. at 50 (quoting Edith Ramirez, Chairman, FTC, Opening Remarks of FTC 
Chairwoman Edith Ramirez FinTech Forum Series: Marketplace Lending 3 (June 9, 
2016)). 
 120. See id. at 86. 
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services for personal, family, or household uses.121 This Rule could be 
amended to cover loans made to consumers for business purposes that are 
secured by personal collateral or that are under a certain size threshold. 
B. STATE REGULATION AND LICENSING OF FINTECH LENDERS 
States are the primary regulators of nonbank financial entities. All 
states require lending licenses for consumer lenders, though some limit 
what type of consumer lending must be licensed. 122  State financial 
regulators oversee nearly five thousand state-chartered banks and have 
the authority to regulate non-depository financial institutions that perform 
a range of functions in a range of markets, though state regulation was 
preempted for a set of financial institutions before the financial crisis.123 
The Coalition of State Banking Commissioners (CSBS) claims that 
Congress intentionally reserved the licensure and supervision of non-
depository financial institutions to the states rather than pass federal 
chartering laws. 124  States, as part of their process for licensing non-
depository institutions, evaluate their safety and soundness requirements 
and conformity to consumer protection statutes. 
States have different legal regimes governing nonbank lending. 
Many states have laws that cap interest rates (state usury caps) and 
provide fair-lending protections.125 This makes state regulators, and state 
law, best suited to evaluate the suitability of a fintech lender’s program 
for the potential borrowers of a given state. Some states require nonbank 
lenders to obtain a license if they are issuing loans to borrowers in that 
                                                                                                                 
 121. See id. at 92. 
 122. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 6, at 36 n. 86. 
 123. State law has been preempted in the past by OCC preemption determination 
letters, although the OCC’s preemption of state supervision of national bank operating 
subsidiaries was repealed in the Dodd-Frank Act. See generally Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
supra note 103. 
 124. See Letter from John W. Ryan, President & CEO, Conference of State Bank 
Supervisors, to Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency, Legis. and Reg. Activities 
Division, (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.csbs.org/sites/default/files/2017-11/CSBS%20 
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20National%20Bank%20Charters%20for%20Fintech%20Companies_0.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/8FJN-EDAE] [hereinafter CSBS Letter]. 
 125. See NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, USURY, https://www.nclc.org/issues/ 
usury.html [https://perma.cc/YR65-6TEG] (last visited Nov. 12, 2018) (providing 
additional information on state usury laws). 
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state, and some states extend this requirement to small business lending.126 
Interest caps have been shown to be one of the simplest and most effective 
ways to protect borrowers from unaffordable loans.127 The removal of this 
protection for fintech borrowers could cause an explosion of high interest 
rates. Many states provide greater fair-lending protection than do federal 
laws and provide privately enforceable protections against unfair and 
deceptive lending practices.128 
As fintech lending has grown, some states and municipalities have 
taken it upon themselves to develop new regulations to govern the 
practices within their state. Illinois, led by the City of Chicago’s 
Treasurer, has proposed licensing small business lenders, and proposed 
SB 2865, which would require lenders to disclose the APR of any 
prospective loan as well as the fees they charge, mimicking the 
requirements under the TILA.129 The bill would also require lenders to 
                                                                                                                 
 126. California, Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Vermont require nonbank 
small business lenders to obtain licenses as well. See Jagtiani & Lemieux, supra note 20, 
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 127. The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 
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136 S. Ct. 2505 (2016). 
 128. See generally Complaint, Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, No. 1:18-cv-02449 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 2018) [hereinafter 
Complaint 2018]. 
 129. S.B. 2865, 99th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2017), http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ 
BillStatus.asp?DocTypeID=SB&DocNum=2865&GAID=13&SessionID=88&LegID=9
6183 [https://perma.cc/QW5T-UVHF]; Small Business Financial Institute, State of 
Illinois Turns its Sites on Online Lenders, ADVICE ON LOAN, https://www.sbfi.org/state-
of-illinois-turns-its-sights-on-online-lenders [https://perma.cc/HGE3-HHSG] (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2018). 
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determine the borrower’s ability to repay before approving the loan.130 
Chicago’s Treasurer, taking the initiative to look at small business 
lending, found that there were no preexisting regulatory solutions.131 The 
city drafted regulations for business-to-business products that focused on 
transparency.132 
New York has proposed similar licensing legislation, which would 
amend Section 340 of the Banking Law to add the requirement that a 
lender must be licensed to lend to either an individual or business for loans 
of $50,000 or less and expand the licensing requirement to entities that 
acquire loans from others.133 
In addition to state legislation, the CSBS (the umbrella organization 
for state banking regulators) has adopted its own process to support state 
regulation of fintech lenders. In response to the OCC’s Nonbank Charter 
Program Proposal (discussed infra), the CSBS has issued Vision 2020, a 
series of initiatives intended to streamline the process for regulation 
across states of fintech lending.134 The stated goal is that by 2020, “state 
regulators will adopt an integrated, 50-state licensing and supervisory 
system, leveraging technology and smart regulatory policy to transform 
the interaction between industry, regulators and consumers.” 135  The 
CSBS’s redesign of the Nationwide Multistate Licensing System (NMLS) 
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is an attempt to streamline the multistate registration process and work 
toward uniformity in regulatory requirements where possible. 136  The 
NMLS will allow for one point of entry for registration and allow states 
to rely on the analyses from other states to more quickly engage with a 
fintech firm. 
C. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY 
SPECIAL PURPOSE NONBANK CHARTER PROGRAM 
An opposing regulatory framework is the OCC’s Nonbank Charter 
Program,137 in which the OCC would issue a special purpose bank charter 
for fintech companies that the OCC claims would “harmonize” the entry 
of these new unregulated firms into the marketplace, but would also 
preempt fintechs from state regulation.138 As of October 2018, the OCC 
Comptroller Joseph Otting stated publicly that it is in discussions with, 
and vetting, several companies who are seeking such a charter.139 One key 
problem with this proposal is the preemption of state law and the impact 
on the interest rate provision that would apply if fintech firms become 
nationally chartered, rather than state-licensed, entities. 140  Fintech 
companies would be able to act like national banks and import interest 
rates from their home state to all states where they do business. 141 
Presumably, therefore, fintechs would incorporate in states where interest 
rate limits are nonexistent. Other concerns include the fact that state 
                                                                                                                 
 136. See CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, State Regulators Take First 
Step to Standardize Licensing Practices for Fintech Payments (Feb. 6, 2018), 
https://www.csbs.org/state-regulators-take-first-step-standardize-licensing-practices-
fintech-payments [https://perma.cc/Y7UV-F4VA]. 
 137. See generally Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency, Supporting Responsible 
Innovation in the Federal Banking System: An OCC Perspective (Mar. 2016) [hereinafter 
OCC Perspective]. 
 138. The OCC announced that it would begin accepting National Bank Charter 
Applications from Financial Technology Companies on July 31, 2018. See OFFICE OF THE 
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, POLICY STATEMENT ON FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY 
COMPANIES’ ELIGIBILITY TO APPLY FOR NATIONAL BANK CHARTERS (Jul. 31, 2018). 
 139. Complaint 2018, supra note 128, at 6. 
 140. See Letter from Lauren Saunders, Associate Director of the Nat’l Consumer L. 
Ctr. to Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller, Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency 7 (May 
31, 2016). 
 141. See generally Charles M. Horn & Melissa R. Hall, The Curious Case of Madden 
v. Midland Funding and the Survival of the Valid-When-Made Doctrine, 21 N.C. 
BANKING INST. 1 (2017). 
100 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXIV 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
preemption would remove the ability of state regulators to directly license 
fintechs, and that the agreements that the OCC would make with a 
chartered fintech would remain private, excluding the fintech from public 
accountability. 
The OCC has framed its policy as a mechanism to promote consistent 
application of laws and regulations among banks and fintech companies, 
and to make the federal banking system stronger by bringing fintech 
companies under the same framework as national banks.142 The Nonbank 
Charter Program would allow the OCC to hold fintech entities to “the 
same rigorous standards of safety and soundness, fair access, and fair 
treatment of customers that apply to all national banks and federal savings 
associations.”143 In other words, the Nonbank Charter Program would 
“mak[e] certain that institutions with federal charters have a regulatory 
framework that is receptive to responsible innovation along with the 
supervision that supports it.”144 The OCC defines responsible innovation 
as: “[t]he use of new or improved financial products, services, and 
processes to meet the evolving needs of consumers, businesses, and 
communities in a manner that is consistent with sound risk management 
and is aligned with the bank’s overall business strategy.”145 One principle 
of responsible innovation clarifies that it includes “fair access to financial 
services and fair treatment of consumers.”146 
Establishing the Nonbank Charter Program provides a route for 
entities to apply, but the OCC must still go through an approval process 
for each applicant.147 The OCC proposed creating “operating agreements” 
with each fintech, which would be confidential.148 The OCC could choose 
to impose specific requirements on uninsured special purpose banks, but 
it is unclear whether there would be any measure of public accountability 
for the operating agreements.149 The agreements would, in theory, create 
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a set of private laws that apply to those entities, but both application and 
enforcement would be impossible to monitor because the agreements 
would be confidential. There would be no way to assure that any rules 
would be applied in a uniform or impartial manner. 
The OCC claims to have the authority to regulate fintechs as banks 
because fintechs engage in lending, one of the core banking activities 
under the NBA and Home Owners’ Loan Act.150 According to the CSBS, 
however, it is unsettled whether the NBA allows for a special purpose 
designation for financial entities that do not collect deposits without 
specific authorization by Congress. 151  The CSBS sued the OCC and 
Comptroller Tom Curry in April 2017 to enjoin the OCC from creating 
the Nonbank Charter Program on the grounds that the OCC would be 
going “far beyond the limited authority granted to it by Congress under 
the NBA and other federal banking laws.”152  Although the case was 
dismissed because the OCC had not yet affirmed it would issue charters, 
the CSBS filed suit again on October 25, 2018.153 The case turns on 
whether the Nonbank Charter Program as understood would be for 
entities that truly are in the “business of banking,” as the OCC claims.154 
The CSBS claims that the “business of banking” requires, at a minimum, 
engaging in receiving deposits.155 Absent congressional authorization for 
a certain kind of bank that does not meet the qualifications of the business 
of banking, the CSBS claims the OCC’s Nonbank Charter Program is 
unlawful.156 There have been examples of attempts by the OCC to charter 
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institutions that were not in the “business of banking” per this definition, 
which were found to be unlawful.157 
The NBA authorizes a special purpose national bank to conduct 
business nationally without being subject to state banking laws.158 Under 
the NBA, core banking activities are defined as receiving deposits, paying 
checks, and lending money. 159  The question raised in the CSBS’s 
complaint is whether an entity should be considered a bank if it engages 
in any one of these core activities, or if it needs to, at a minimum, accept 
deposits in order for the OCC to have the authority to designate the entity 
as a special purpose bank.160 Congress mandates designated entities that 
do not take deposits as special purpose banks, such as bankers’ banks and 
trust banks, but it is unclear whether the OCC can take this step on its 
own. The OCC’s approach has been to view the NBA as allowing for new 
kinds of activities that fall within the broader scope of the business of 
banking. In describing how it would approach the Nonbank Charter 
Program, the OCC claims that it would consider the “permissibility” of 
new activities on a case-by-case basis. 
How is the “business of banking” defined? The answer can be found 
by looking at what makes an entity cross the line into needing a banking 
charter rather than remain a nonbank entity. The CSBS claims that this 
line is crossed when an entity receives deposits, because then its business 
becomes a public concern.161 The OCC claims that because fintechs lend 
money, which is one of the three core functions of banking, they fall 
within its purview.162 The CSBS explains the confusion that would be 
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created if fintech entities became true special purpose banks: since they 
would not have full-service charters, most banking laws, such as the Bank 
Holding Company Act, would not apply to them. 163  Would they be 
required to be Federal Reserve members? What would be their role in the 
payment system? One alternative is that the OCC could, as a condition of 
the charter, impose either adherence to state usury caps or follow the 
Military Lending Act and impose a 36% cap.164 The CSBS claims that the 
OCC is overstepping its authority in this regard as well because 
preemption authority must come from Congress.165 The CSBS believes 
that “the OCC has intentionally structured the special purpose nonbank 
charter to evade the application of certain federal banking laws.”166 
Another approach recommended by advocates is that the OCC 
Nonbank Charter Program could require that fintechs have “financial 
inclusion” plans and establish Community Reinvestment Act-like 
obligations for fintechs.167 The OCC could also require fintechs to use 
debt-to-income ratios that do not exceed a certain threshold. In sum, the 
OCC proposal is problematic for two distinct reasons: 1) it would not 
increase borrower protection from predatory practices, and 2) it may be 
unlawful because fintechs should not be considered banks under the 
National Bank Act. 
CONCLUSION 
To best protect small business borrowers, nonbank lending to such 
borrowers should be included in the federal consumer protection statutes, 
and the small business lending market should be placed under the CFPB’s 
jurisdiction. There is also ample reason to support robust state-level 
fintech regulation. Small businesses require access to credit and are the 
backbone of the American economy. In order for fintech lending to small 
businesses to support future American prosperity, a new framework is 
necessary. 
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